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In 1971, the authors produced a thirty-year forecast of leisure in the U.K 
(http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/archive/00000345/01/mitton1a.pdf).  In 2001 they obtained 
survey data for comparison with the forecasts.  The paper presents the original forecasts 
and describes the methods used to produce them, assesses their accuracy in the light of 
the survey data, and concludes with some reflections on the underlying forecasting 
methodology and on changes in leisure patterns. 
 
 
A Social Forecast Revisited 
 
In 1971, as young researchers, we produced a forecast of the future of leisure in the 
United Kingdom [1].  In 2001, the Future Foundation, of which Michael Willmott is 
now a director, gathered some survey data on leisure activities.  Since 2001 was the 
target year for our forecasts, this gave us an opportunity to see how good our forecasts 
were, to reassess the mechanism by which our forecasts were made and to test the 
assumptions that underpin many of today’s forecasting methods.  It also provides some 
interesting pointers to the nature of social and economic change in Britain over the 
course of the last 30 years and the role of leisure within that.  But, before considering 
these questions, we need to explain the forecasts and how we came to make them. 
 
We were working then at the Institute of Community Studies in Bethnal Green, where 
Michael Young and Peter Willmott were analysing the results of their London Region 
Survey, which were to form the basis of their book The Symmetrical Family [2].  The 
telecommunications division of the Post Office (later British Telecom, later still BT) 
commissioned the Institute to carry out a forecast of leisure, one of a set of related 
forecasts of aspects of life in the U.K. in 2001.  The London Region Survey had 
contained questions about a range of leisure activities, and the results were to form the 
basis for the forecast. (The report itself was not published but part of it was used as the 
basis for Appendix 5 of The Symmetrical Family.) 
 
We claim no originality for the basic forecasting method we used.  Variations on it were 
well known at the time and are in widespread use today. The report on the forecast [3] 
describes it as follows: 
 
The central assumption is that current variations in behaviour can be used to indicate what 
future patterns are likely to be.  We know, for example, that swimming and income are related – 
richer people do more swimming.  We also know that people in the U.K. will be richer in 2001.  
So we conclude that people in 2001 will do more swimming.  To take bingo as another example, 
we know that bingo and social class are related – lower status people play more bingo.  We also 
know that there will be relatively fewer people in these social classes by 2001. So we conclude 
that less bingo will be played in 2001. 
 
At a general level there is historical justification for this reasoning – as incomes have risen, 
people have tended to take over the habits formerly confined to the rich.  When working-class 
people began to be able to afford a holiday away from home, for example, they did what the 
middle classes had done before (and what the aristocracy had done before them) – they went to 
the seaside.  But at a specific level, as in forecasting swimming or bingo, this approach is clearly 
too simple.  Well over half the people in the U.K. whose annual income is less than £1000 are 
aged over 60, so the apparent lack of enthusiasm for swimming among the poor might be due as 
much to their old age as to their poverty.  They would not necessarily take to the water in large 
numbers even if they had higher incomes. 
 
Another way of putting this is to say that swimming, though partly dependent on income, is also 
dependent on age.  A forecast of swimming that uses income as the only forecasting variable will 
probably be wrong.  One has to use both income and age together.  By a similar argument, a 
case could be made for also taking into account car ownership, health, access to swimming pools 
and many other things.  But we did not have data on all these other factors, even assuming we 
could cope with the complexity.  We had to choose a limited set of forecasting variables, and in 
this study we used those that surveys had suggested as the most important – age, income, social 
class, education and car ownership. 
 
The method that we used to assess the relative importance of these variables for each 
leisure activity was fairly homespun.  For each activity, we simply looked at a large 
number of tables of results from the London Region Survey – showing, for example, 
how swimming was related to age and income, age and car-ownership and so on – and 
made our own estimates of the importance of each of the five variables in determining 
participation in that activity [4].  (Nowadays, of course, there are multivariate statistical 
techniques that can analyse this quite simply and more accurately.  Although such 
methods were available in the early 1970s, for some reason we did not use them; 
perhaps we did not have the necessary computing facilities, or perhaps we just did not 
know about them then.)   
 
The forecasts of the five forecasting variables themselves – the breakdown of the adult 
population of the U.K. in 2001 by age, income, social class and so on – were obviously 
fundamental.  We used official forecasts where these existed, or the other forecasts 
commissioned by the Post Office, or we made our own extrapolations from published 
figures.  The forecasts we used were as follows, with, where available, data from the 
present day for comparison [5].  The figures are percentages of the population of the 
U.K. aged 18 or over, except those for car-ownership and income, which are percentages 
of households. 
 
  1971 2001 forecast Recent actual 
Age 18-24 15 15 11 
 25-29 9 10  9 
 30-39 16 19 20 
 40-49 17 17 17 
 50-59 17 16 16 
 >= 60 26 23 27 
     
Income <£1000 per year 44 8 15 
(at 1971 prices) £1000 < £2000 44 28 22 
 £2000 < £3000 8 27 19 
 £3000 < £4000 2 23 17 
 £4000 < £5000 1 6 11 
 >= £5000 1 8 16 
     
Occupational class I Professional 5 19 N/A 
 II Managerial 17 14 N/A 
 IIInm Clerical 10 7 N/A 
 IIIm Skilled 41 44 N/A 
 IV Semi-skilled 19 11 N/A 
 V Unskilled 8 5 N/A 
     
Age of finishing 16 or under 84 55 60 
full-time education 17-19 9 29 20 
 20 or over 7 16 20 
     
Car-ownership No car 50 18 27 
(in household) One car 42 58 44 
 Two or more 8 24 29 
 
The forecast we used for age overestimated the numbers of young people and 
underestimated the numbers of elderly, by a few percent in each case.  On income, the 
Post Office forecast of the overall increase in average incomes was about right (a 2.2 
fold increase in real terms between 1971 and 2001).  But, our estimates of the current 
distribution of incomes shows that the assumptions on how that overall rise in income 
would be shared across the population were not correct [6].  While the projections 
foresaw a rebalancing towards middle-income groups, in fact the proportion of 
households in higher income groups has grown faster and those in the poorest fallen less 
than had been expected.  Income polarisation had been decreasing since the war, but 
from the middle of the 1970s – just a few years after our forecasts were done – and for 
the next twenty years, the gap between rich and poor increased.  On car ownership, 
although we did a bit better, we encountered the same (and presumably related) problem 
as with income in that we did not expect that inequality in British society would actually 
increase.  
 
The social class forecasts are more difficult to assess because the definitions have 
changed over time.  In fact official statistics no longer use the five-class system used for 
the forecasts.  For most of the last thirty years the SEG (Socio-Economic Group) system 
has been preferred, and that too has now been superseded by the NS-SEC (National 
Statistics Socio-Economic Classification).  The following table gives figures from 1975 
and 2000 for the adult population divided up by SEGs [7]: 
 
 1975 (%) 2000 (%) 
Professional 3 5 
Employer and Managerial 9 16 
Intermediate and Junior non-manual 32 35 
Skilled manual and own-account non-professional 24 20 
Semi-skilled manual and personal service 24 18 
Unskilled manual 8 6 
 
These figures suggest that the forecast was broadly right in predicting an increase at the 
upper end and a decrease at the lower, but it looks as though the very high growth 
predicted for class 1 was a bit wayward. 
 
These considerations highlight an obvious point about forecasting – it can only be as 
good as the assumptions that underlie any model.  In Britain, government forecasters 
have consistently under-estimated the ageing of the population [8] while, as we have 
pointed out, changes in income distribution have proved equally difficult to predict.   
 
The leisure data for 1971 came from the responses of about 2000 adults in the London 
Region to the question “Have you engaged in this activity at least once in the last twelve 
months?”  The alternative was “twelve times or more”.  Our reason for using the “once” 
figures was simply that the number of participants in many leisure activities is very 
small – perhaps only two or three percent of the adult population; adopting the “twelve 
times” criterion would have drastically reduced the numbers in our tables and thus ruled 
out many activities from the study.  So far as we could tell from the more popular 
activities, the “twelve times” people did not differ from the “once” people in social 
profile, only in numbers.  The data for 2001 came from a survey [9] of about 1000 adults 
in the U.K., using the same question and list of activities as in 1971.  
 
Using London Region data gave us a problem in 1971 since we were required to 
produce forecasts for the whole of the country, so we had to make estimates of leisure 
figures for the U.K. based on the Greater London results (see Appendix).  Even though 
the Greater London Region contains around a half of the population of the U.K., leisure 
activities have strong regional variation, so this adds another area of uncertainty to the 
forecasting exercise and, in retrospect, is probably one explanation for some of the 
differences between forecasts and outcome that we discuss below. 
 
So, to return to our original question, how well did we do with our forecasts?  The 
original report summarised the overall forecast as follows: 
 
The outstanding feature of the forecasts is that almost everything is likely to increase.  This is 
simply a reflection of the outstanding feature of the survey data – that richer, higher status, more 
educated, car-owning people do more of almost everything.  Since the basic forecast is that 
people in the U.K. will be richer, more educated, doing higher status jobs and owning more cars, 
it follows that almost every activity will have more participants in 2001.  
 
We were broadly right about that.  Of the 48 activities that were included in both 
surveys, 34 of them (71%) had risen in popularity, and, while several of the rising ones 
had risen strikingly, those that had gone down, with a couple of exceptions, had not gone 
down by much. 
 
 
We were also right about the general level of increase. For each of the 48 activities in 
1971 we have a percentage of people taking part, so we can calculate the average of 
these percentages.  This is not a very meaningful figure in itself, but we can do the same 
for the forecasts and for the participation rates of 2001.  This gives us some idea of the 
overall level of increase. 
 
The average of the 1971 rates was 22.2% and the average of our forecasts 25.3%.  The 
average of the 2001 activity rates was 25.8%.  Our forecast was for an overall increase 
in participation of 1.14.  The actual figure was 1.16.  
 
We can repeat this exercise for groups of activities.  The table below shows the results: 
 






Sports as participant 8.2 10.0 12.0 1.22 1.46 11 
Sports as spectator (not on TV) 5.9 6.9 7.0 1.17 1.19 12 
Home-based activities 38.4 43.0 43.5 1.12 1.13 10 
Away-from-home other than sport 34.8 39.6 39.1 1.14 1.12 15 
All activities 22.2 25.3 25.8 1.14 1.16 48 
 
We chose participant sports as a fast growing group of activities, and we were right 
about that; in fact the actual increase was substantially greater than we forecast.  For the 
other groups, our forecasts were surprisingly accurate. 
 
Turning to individual activities, the picture is more confused.  We seem to have done 
better with those activities that had higher rates of participation.  Presumably this is 
partly an artefact of the measure we are using, namely the change in the percentage 
engaging in the activity.  There is, obviously, more scope for growth for a minority 
activity; a figure of, say, four percent, might go up by a factor of two, three, four or 
more, whereas a figure of, say, 67% clearly cannot increase by a factor of more than 1.5.  
The basis of our comparisons – the estimates of 1971 and the survey results of 2001 – 
are probably also more reliable for the larger percentages. 
 
The following table gives our results for the high-participation activities, namely those 
engaged in by more than 50% of the adult population: 
 
 1971 2001 Forecast 2001 Actual 
Going for a drive (for pleasure) 68% 78% 64% 
Listening to recorded music (not on 
radio) 68% 70% 89% 
Reading a book (not a magazine) 67% 74% 72% 
Walk (for mile or more) 65% 68% 72% 
Gardening 63% 67% 62% 
Pub (not just for lunch) 62% 69% 71% 
Going out for meal (not just for lunch) 62% 70% 84% 
DIY 60% 66% 63% 
Cinema 53% 58% 56% 
 
We did quite well with these but were wide of the mark with driving, listening to music 
and eating out.  Driving is interesting.  Like car maintenance and car cleaning, which are 
included in the next table, driving for pleasure was, not surprisingly, strongly related to 
car ownership and, since car ownership was set to increase, we forecast an increase in all 
three of these car-related activities.  However, though car maintenance and car cleaning 
have indeed increased, in fact by more than we forecast, driving for pleasure has actually 
gone down.  In 1971 more people were ‘taking a drive for pleasure’ than actually owned 
cars – others were clearly taking them out.  Today this appears less prevalent.  In a 
mature car-based society, the sheer novelty of going for a drive may have worn off while 
the amount of traffic on the road today may also have reduced the simple pleasure of 
doing so.   
 
Listening to music has increased by a good deal more than we thought.  An important 
variable here, which we made no attempt to take into account, is technology.  There are 
now more ways of listening, such as the Walkman and more recently minidisc and mp3 
players, than there were in 1971.  There are also more places to eat – notably American-
style burger bars, pizza parlours and the like – which must partly explain the figures for 
eating out. 
 
The figures for gardening look strange.  It is hard to believe that gardening has not 
increased when garden centres have been springing up like mushrooms and when 
gardening programmes on TV seem to be rivalled only by cookery and interior design.  
Indeed, official statistics [10] suggest that participation has increased for both gardening 
and DIY, by roughly the amount we forecast.  There is some suggestion that our original 
estimate may, because of regional differences, have overestimated actual participation in 
1971 – in the 2001 survey, those in the South East had the highest gardening 
participation rate.   
 
The second group of activities have participation rates between 15% and 50%: 
 
 1971 2001 forecast 2001 actual 
Knitting or sewing 46% 44% 26% 
Theatre 37% 45% 35% 
Church (includes wedding or funeral) 37% 41% 37% 
Car cleaning 33% 50% 59% 
Dancing 31% 35% 34% 
Swimming 29% 37% 44% 
Museum 25% 32% 32% 
Darts 21% 22% 15% 
Car maintenance 21% 27% 32% 
Football (spectator) 20% 22% 24% 
Art gallery 17% 25% 20% 




Knitting/sewing was one of the few activities for which we forecast a decrease, but not 
by nearly enough.  That theatre-going, for which we forecast a rise, should have 
remained static or even declined seems surprising – higher-income, higher-status people 
go to the theatre more often, so theatre attendance ought to have gone up – but these 
figures are confirmed by official statistics which show that, at least for the second half of 
our forecast period (1987 – 1998, to be precise), the only cultural activity that increased 
was cinema-going [11].  Perhaps our over-estimate of the growth of social class I 
skewed this forecast particularly strongly. 
 
Swimming, easily the most popular of the active sports and therefore the first to appear 
in these lists, has risen by more than we said.  It is possible that much of this swimming 
takes place on holiday and, though we correctly forecast an increase in holidays, and 
particularly in foreign holidays, elsewhere in the report, we did not explicitly take this 
into account in the swimming forecast. 
 
Our forecasts for the final, and largest, group – the minority activities - are a mixed bag: 
 
 1971 2001 forecast 2001 actual 
Collecting stamps etc 12% 13.5% 11% 
Billiards or snooker 12% 12.5% 20% 
Table tennis 11% 13% 6% 
Cricket (spectator) 10% 13% 8% 
Caravanning 10% 11% 12.5% 
Fishing 9% 10% 9.5% 
Playing an instrument 9% 11.5% 12% 
Ten-pin bowling 9% 10% 23% 
Tennis 8% 10% 9% 
Motor sports (spectator) 7% 8% 7% 
Golf 7% 10% 12% 
Camping 7% 8% 12.5% 
Swimming (spectator) 6% 6.5% 9.5% 
Football 6% 7% 11.5% 
Horseracing (spectator) 5.5% 7% 3.5% 
Tennis (spectator) 5.5% 7.5% 4% 
Model-building 5.5% 6.5% 8.5% 
Cricket 4.5% 5% 5% 
Wrestling (spectator) 4% 4% 1% 
Rugby (spectator) 3.5% 4.5% 9% 
Sailing 3% 4.5% 2.5% 
Athletics (spectator) 3% 3.5% 4.5% 
Boxing (spectator) 3% 3% 4.5% 
Golf (spectator) 2.5% 3% 6% 
Bowls 2% 2% 4% 
Athletics 2% 2% 5% 
 
The effect of television can presumably be seen in the contrasting fortunes of snooker on 
the one hand and wrestling (spectator) on the other, the first enjoying hours of air time 
on a regular basis, the second losing the coverage it used to have.  Football also, of 
course, receives large amounts of television coverage and the figures for football playing 
seem to reflect this.  The figures for watching football (in the previous table) do not 
show quite such a large rise.  The last thirty years have seen the introduction of all-seater 
stadia that have reduced attendance capacity.  This, together with the massive promotion 
of the sport and increased costs (mainly through player wages), has also raised entrance 
prices.  In fact, given these developments, it is perhaps surprising that football spectating 
has grown faster then we forecast.  But then this is an example of a sport that, at least at 
the top end of the league, has managed to make itself more middle-class.   
 
With camping and caravanning, as with swimming, it may be that we would have done 
better if we had specifically taken account of holidays.  It seems likely, for example, that 
some of the growth in caravanning is in fact an increase in the number of people taking a 
second holiday at a caravan park.  Similarly, the success of Eurocamp and the like in 
providing summer holidays in France and the rest of Europe must have boosted the 
camping figures.  (Whether purists would consider these as real camping or caravanning 
is another matter.) 
 
Ten-pin bowling was perhaps our worst forecast.  Many bowling alleys were built in the 
1960s but the initial enthusiasm wore off and, by 1971, the Rank Organisation had 
closed many of them and the sport was in the doldrums.  They, or other providers, must 
have decided that they had over-reacted and restored some of the provision.  Our survey 
snapshot of this activity caught it at a bad time. 
 
Four of the spectator sports make an interesting group.  The people who watched rugby, 
golf, tennis and horseracing were very much the same – higher income, car-owning, 
professional and managerial classes – so our forecasts were for a modest increase in all 
four.  In fact the first two have risen sharply, the other two have declined.  The result for 
rugby is in part an artefact of our regional problem mentioned earlier. Watching rugby is 
much more popular in the north than the south (league versus union), as is confirmed by 
the 2001 survey, so our original estimates for the country as a whole (based as they were 
on a survey in the South East) were almost certainly lower than they should have been.  
Hence our lower forecast and hence the discrepancy with today’s national figure.  Even 
so, attendance at club and international matches in rugby union shows that some of the 
increase is genuine [12].  These four sports highlight an important aspect not included in 
our forecasting method: marketing.  Rugby and golf have both been marketed 
aggressively and, it seems, effectively.  Tennis less so and horseracing hardly at all [13]. 
 
Some of the figures seem strange.  The proportion of adults watching swimming seems 
extraordinarily high.  Are they parents watching their children in swimming galas?  The 
figures from our 2001 survey suggest this is the case with parents three times as likely to 
be swimming spectators as other people.  And it is surprising that sailing, an activity 
closely related to income, should have remained static or even gone down at a time of 
rising incomes.  We noted that supply constraints could affect the growth of sailing and 
other water sports but it seems unlikely that a ceiling had already been reached in 1971.  
The answer for the discrepancy here is again likely to be our original national estimates 
based on a regional survey.  Sailing is much more popular in the south than it is in other 
parts of the country (4.1% for the South East and 5.0% for the South West and Wales 
compared to 1.3% in other parts of the U.K. according to our 2001 survey).  In contrast 
to watching rugby where we under-estimated participation, in this case we probably 
over-estimated it and thus produced a higher forecast for the country as a whole than 
was appropriate.   
 
There are some absentees from these tables that need a word of comment.  Television 
viewing, a huge leisure-time activity, is not in the tables at all.  This is because our 
standard measure – people who had taken part in the activity at least once in the last 
twelve months – is useless for television since the figure would be close to 100%.  We 
did produce a forecast for television viewing in the report, but using time-diary data 
rather than the questionnaire results.  The time-diarists were composed entirely of 
married people aged 30 to 49, so the viewing times did not apply to the whole 
population, but we forecast, for this group, a reduction in the weekly viewing from about 
13 hours to about 11.  Official figures for 1998 put the average weekly viewing for this 
group at about 23 hours and it has been suggested to us that this figure has not changed 
much since the 1960s [14].  It seems that our time-diary data for TV viewing was not 
comparable to the official figures for the population as a whole in 1971.  But, it remains 
the case that, even with a different figure at that time, we would still have forecast a 
decline in the activity – something we return to below.   
 
There were actually 69 activities listed in our 1971 report, of which 48 were chosen for 
the 2001 survey.  The omitted ones include various small-minority sports such as water-
skiing, fencing and horseriding, some indoor hobbies including handicrafts, cards, chess, 
crosswords and cooking, and also adult education and bingo.  Winter sports, though 
appearing in the list of spectator sports, are absent from the participant sports; this was 
possibly an oversight in the original survey.  Basketball was also absent from the 
original survey, perhaps being considered too obscure, though it would probably deserve 
inclusion today.  Cycling was another strange absentee. 
 
More interestingly, communicating via the computer, playing computer games, surfing 
the web – now all major leisure activities – are completely absent from the forecasts.  
Computers in 1971 were mainframes run by governments, universities or large 
organisations.  They resembled collections of metallic wardrobes and were tended round 
the clock in air-conditioned rooms by trained operators.  We suggested that people might 
communicate with them from terminals in their homes (another of our forecasts was that 
people would do more work from home, and there is some evidence that we were right).  
But computers that people would have on their desks, or in their homes, or carry around 
with them, were in the realms of science fiction.  It is, of course, another shortcoming of 
our forecasting method that it cannot forecast an activity that does not already exist. 
 
The other big absentee was what is now labelled “keep fit” which would include jogging 
(which might be one of the reasons why the athletics figure is significantly higher than 
we forecast), going to the gym, yoga and the like – all of which are reasonably 
commonplace nowadays.  (For example, according to Future Foundation research the 
proportion of the population practising yoga has increased from 1% in 1986 to 6% 
today. [15])  This is another area where cultural change – in this instance increasing 
health awareness and in its extremes an obsession with the body – has had a major 
impact on the nature of leisure. 
 
What, then, can we conclude from a review of our forecasting exercise of thirty years 
ago?  First, we are pleased, if somewhat surprised, that the forecasts were not too bad.  
We were right in many areas and wrong in some – spectacularly so in a few instances.  
But overall, we got the general drift right. 
 
This review has highlighted some important points about forecasting as a science and 
the nature of social and economic change.  To summarise these: 
 
1. Any forecast is only as good as the assumptions that go into the model – a point 
generally recognised within the forecasting community.  If your views about 
demographic or economic developments in the future turn out to be incorrect 
then, of course, your forecasts will suffer.  This suggests that the development of 
scenarios that allow for a variety of different assumptions can be a useful tool. 
2. Governments and other, external global forces (that promote competition, for 
example) continue to be important in influencing the development of markets – 
in this instance leisure activity.  The policy changes (or global pressures, it 
matters not which for the purposes of this argument) that changed the trend in 
income distribution from the mid 1970s onwards had a direct impact on our 
forecasts.   
3. Cultural factors are clearly important in forecasting leisure activities.  We 
include in this the regional variations we have highlighted but we also note those 
activities that become fashionable or passé.  An example of the latter is knitting 
(although there is clearly an economic element to this too – clothes prices have 
fallen so much in real terms that there is little to be gained economically from 
producing your own clothes); one of the former would be keep fit.  It is difficult 
to know how one can forecast the development of a whole new category of 
leisure like going to the gym. 
4. Market initiatives by suppliers (or governing bodies) can clearly have a major 
impact on the development of a sector.  Our forecasts were wrong for ten-pin 
bowling because of supply-side developments.  Conversely, horse racing (with 
some notable exceptions like Ascot and Cheltenham - see footnote) has failed to 
adapt sufficiently to appeal to developing consumer demands and expectations, 
and has failed to market itself properly. 
5. Finally, new technology.  It can be an extremely difficult aspect to forecast 
although a few people (for example, Arthur C Clarke) have been reasonably 
successful in predicting technological advance.  And people like Clarke are good 
at the general rather than the specific.  Were many people in 1941 – 30 years 
before we were first analysing the leisure data – predicting the role and 
importance of television in people’s lives and use of time in 1971, let alone 
2001?  And, as we pointed out, it was hard to even comprehend in the early 
seventies the potential impact of the digital revolution on people’s leisure and 
wider lives. 
 
But, all in all, we are left with two main conclusions.  First, that the oft-predicted 
movement towards a more leisure-focused society continues at a steady pace [16]. In 
some instances, this results in a form of self-imposed pressure as we try to do more 
and more leisure activities in a not sufficiently expanding volume of leisure time (a 
direct comparison of the two surveys shows that the total number of any given 
activities that an individual will do in a year has increased by 20% over the 30 years 
– and remember this does not include ‘new’ categories like keep fit).  But overall, 
this is surely a positive development and even, as Jonathan Gershuny has argued, 
one that is good for the economic development of the country [17]. 
 
The second point that is particularly pleasing for forecasters is that the simple 
assumption that what certain groups in society do now is a good predictor of future 
trends has held up reasonably well; on the whole what the rich and famous do today, 
the mass of people will do tomorrow.  
 
 
Appendix – London Region data, U.K. forecasts 
 
 
Our leisure data were from the London Region; our population forecasts were for the 
U.K.  Did it make any sense to combine them?  Well, yes and no.  Of course it would 
have been better to have had leisure data for the U.K. as we could then have taken 
account of regional variations – the weekend sailors in the south west, the golfers in 
Scotland, the rugby league supporters in the north, and so on.  But we had to make the 
best of what we had.  What we did was to make estimates of the level of participation in 
leisure activities in the U.K. in 1971.  We did this by using exactly the same method that 
we were using for 2001, only with figures on income, car ownership and so on for 1971.  
We then compared our 2001 forecast with our 1971 estimate.  Of course, some of our 
1971 estimates will have been wrong, because of the sort of regional variations just 
mentioned, but we argued that this did not invalidate the forecasts.  Basically we were 
saying that, given the social profile of an activity and given the likely changes in the 
population, we could expect roughly this many more (or fewer) people to be taking part 
in that activity by 2001. 
 
The absence of proper U.K. leisure data for 1971 is, however, more of a drawback for 
the present exercise since we now have U.K. data for 2001 and would like to have data, 
rather than estimates, for 1971 for comparison.  If we find that participation in some 
activity appears to have gone up more, or less, than we forecast, we cannot be sure how 
far the forecast was wrong; it might simply be that the 1971 estimate was wide of the 
mark. 
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